Environmental Law by Singer, Marian S.
South Carolina Law Review 
Volume 44 
Issue 1 ANNUAL SURVEY OF SOUTH CAROLINA 
LAW 
Article 10 
Fall 1992 
Environmental Law 
Marian S. Singer 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Marian S. Singer, Environmental Law, 44 S. C. L. Rev. 94 (1992). 
This Article is brought to you by the Law Reviews and Journals at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in South Carolina Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholar Commons. For more information, please 
contact dillarda@mailbox.sc.edu. 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
I. NOTICE AND OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD REQUIRED IN
WATER QUALiTY 401 CERTIFICATION APPEAL
In Stono River Environmental Protection Ass'n v. South Carolina
Department of Health & Environmental Control' the South Carolina
Supreme Court held that the board of the Department of Health and
Environmental Control (DHEC) denied due process to intervening parties
by issuing 401 certification2 before completing adjudicatory proceedings
already in progress Stono River attempts to clarify what constitutes
minimum due process for parties challenging 401 certification decisions
after Triska v. South Carolina Department of Health & Environmental
Control.4
In May 1985, Harry A. Brunson, owner of Buzzard's Roost Marina,
applied to DHEC for 401 certification.' The DHEC staff denied his
application. 6 When Brunson appealed this decision to the DHEC board,
both the Stono River Environmental Protection Association (Stono River
EPA) and the Sierra Club moved to intervene against the possible
issuance of the 401 certification.' Brunson argued that Stono River EPA
1. 305 S.C. 90, 406 S.E.2d 340 (1991).
2. See Clean Water Act, § 401, 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1) (1988) (describing
process commonly known as "401 certification"). Under § 401 of the Clean Water
Act, DHEC must determine whether any proposed activity that may result in a
discharge into navigable waters will comply with state water-quality standards. Id.
3. Stono River, 305 S.C. at 94, 406 S.E.2d at 342.
4. 292 S.C. 190, 355 S.E.2d 531 (1987). In Triska the South Carolina Supreme
Court found that 401 certification was not a "contested case" under the South
Carolina Administrative Procedures Act, see infra note 11, and that DHEC therefore
had no authority to conduct an adjudicatory hearing or to suspend or revoke 401
certification after the appeal period had expired. Id. at 195-97, 355 S.E.2d at 533-34.
5. DHEC's 401 certification was required before the South Carolina Coastal
Council and the United States Army Corps of Engineers could issue permits to
Brunson to begin expansion of his marina. Stono River, 305 S.C. at 92, 406 S.E.2d
at 341.
6. The DHEC board relied upon and interpreted Triska as precluding any need
for it to continue hearings before approving the application. Id.
7. Id. The DHEC board granted Stono River EPA's request for leave to
intervene, but had not yet ruled on the Sierra Club's motion when this dispute arose.
Id.
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and the Sierra Club should not be allowed to intervene because under
Triska, the DHEC board was not authorized to grant adjudicatory
hearings in 401 certification cases.' The DHEC board agreed. At a
regularly scheduled meeting, the board reconsidered Brunson's applica-
tion and issued the 401 certification. 9 Stono River EPA and the Sierra
Club sought review of the board's decision, but the circuit court
affirmed. 10
On appeal to the supreme court, Stono River EPA and the Sierra
Club argued that they were entitled to a full adjudicatory hearing because
401 certification is a "contested case" under the South Carolina Adminis-
trative Procedure Act (APA).I Conversely, DHEC and Brunson
contended that Triska justified DHEC's termination of the adjudicatory
proceedings.'" The supreme court defined the determinative issue as
"whether Stono River EPA and the Sierra Club were denied an opportu-
nity to contest the 401 certification in an adjudicatory proceeding."13
The court acknowledged that according to Triska, 401 certification
was not a "contested case" under the APA.14 However, the Stono River
court reasoned that Triska does not preclude the availability of "some
type of administrative evidentiary appeal . . . in 401 certification
cases" 5 because administrative agencies such as DHEC must "meet
minimum standards of due process." 6 Accordingly, the court looked
beyond the APA and found that the due process provisions of the South
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 91, 406 S.E.2d at 341.
11. Id. at 93, 406 S.E.2d at 342. The South Carolina APA is codified at S.C.
CODE ANN. §§ 1-23-310 to -400 (Law. Co-op. 1986). Section 1-23-310(2) defines
a "contested case" as a "proceeding, including but not restricted to ratemaking, price
fixing, and licensing, in which the legal rights, duties or privileges of a party are
required by law to be determined by an agency after an opportunity for hearing."
S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-23-310(2), quoted in Stono River, 305 S.C. at 93, 406 S.E.2d
at 341. If a matter is a "contested case," the administrative agency must conduct an
adjudicatory hearing to address the issues that aggrieved parties raise. Stono River,
305 S.C. at 92 n.2, 406 S.E.2d at 341 n.2 (citing S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-23-320).
12. Stono River, 305 S.C. at 92-93, 406 S.E.2d at 341.
13. Id. at 92, 406 S.E.2d at 341.
14. Id. at 93, 406 S.E.2d at 342.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 93-94, 406 S.E.2d at 342.
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Carolina Constitution require notice and opportunity to be heard in such
administrative appeals. 7
The court concluded that DHEC's actions lacked specific compo-
nents of due process; 8 the mere presence of the parties at the DHEC
board meeting did not suffice. 9 Although the appeals of Stono River
EPA and the Sierra Club were timely, DHEC did not give the parties
notice of the issues under consideration.20 Therefore, the parties did not
have the opportunity to present evidence or to cross-examine witness-
es.2" Accordingly, the court found that DHEC's procedure did not meet
the minimum standards of due process required by the South Carolina
Constitution.'
Currently, Stono River has little practical effect on the procedural
protections that DHEC must afford parties in 401 certification appeals
because, since November 1990, 401 certification appeals have been
17. Id. at 94, 406 S.E.2d at 342 (quoting S.C. CONST. art. I, § 22 ("No person
shall be finally bound by a judicial or quasi-judicial decision of an administrative
agency affecting private rights except on due notice and an opportunity to be heard
... and he shall have in all instances the right to judicial review.")).
18. Id. As the court recognized: "'Due process is flexible and calls for such
procedural protections as the particular situation demands.'" Id. at 94, 406 S.E.2d
at 342 (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972)); see also DAVID E.
SHIPLEY, SOUTH CAROLINA ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 5-17 to 5-20 (2d ed. 1989)
(discussing the Administrative Procedures Act and due process considerations).
Importantly, the section of the South Carolina Constitution that the court cited
does not state expressly that parties should have the right to cross-examine or call
witnesses under oath. See supra note 17. Past South Carolina Supreme Court
decisions have left undecided the degree of procedural due process required in the
administrative context. See SHIPLEY, supra, at 5-22 to 5-25. Shipley contrasts the
court's holdings in Smith & Smith, Inc. v. South Carolina Public Service Commis-
sion, 271 S.C. 405, 247 S.E.2d 677 (1978) (requiring a full adjudicatory hearing),
and First Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Board of Bank Control, 263 S.C. 59, 207
S.E.2d 801 (1974) (ruling that no adversarial hearing was required because a brief
personal appearance before the administrative board satisfied due process).
19. See Stono River, 305 S.C. at 94, 406 S.E.2d at 342.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. The court expressly distinguished Triska, stating that in Triska "DHEC
attempted to revoke a 401 certification more than three years after certification had
been granted and the appeal process had expired. Moreover, an adjudicatory hearing
was held in Triska, and all parties had an opportunity to present evidence and cross
examine witnesses." Id. at 93, 406 S.E.2d at 341.
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"contested cases" under the APA.D However, Stono River establishes
possible precedent for parties appealing decisions in other administrative
contexts when the issue does not fall within the APA's definition of
"contested case."24
Marian Staton Singer
23. S.C. CODE REGS. 61-101(G)(5) (1991). DHEC now grants these appeals full
adjudicatory hearings as prescribed under South Carolina Code of Regulations 61-72.
Id.
24. See, e.g., League of Women Voters v. Litchfield-by-the-Sea, 305 S.C. 424,
409 S.E.2d 378 (1991). In this case, Litchfield-by-the-Sea ("Litchfield") petitioned
DHEC for a permit to build a sewer system for a residential development. Id. at 425,
409 S.E.2d at 379. Litchfield also needed the South Carolina Coastal Council to
certify that the project was consistent with the Coastal Zone Management Program.
Id. This certification is not coextensive with 401 certification and, therefore, was not
covered by S.C. CODE REGS. 61-101 (1991). The South Carolina Supreme Court
cited Triska and Stono River as consistent with its holding that parties appealing the
council's certification are entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard. Litchfield,
305 S.C. at 426-27, 409 S.E.2d at 380. The court did not address whether the South
Carolina Constitution requires trial-type proceedings or substantially less-extensive
procedures.
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